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Abstract
The literature surrounding variables affecting crime is infinite; however, little of that
research, especially in economics, focuses on how hurricanes affect crime. In addition,
much of the research that has been conducted on this is conflicting. Thus, this paper seeks
to shed light on this topic using Hurricane Katrina’s impact on Louisiana as a case study.
Using crime data from the FBI UCR and ICPSR from 1995-2014, I employ a differencesin-differences (DD) strategy to estimate the hurricane’s effect on burglary, larceny, motor
vehicle theft, robbery, aggravated assault, and murder. My findings suggest burglary,
larceny, and robbery increase following the hurricane, while other crime rates (motor
vehicle theft, aggravated assault, and murder) do not change. The results of this study
have multiple implications and present numerous avenues for future research.

Keywords: crime, hurricanes, economics of crime, opportunity cost, natural disaster,
differences-in-differences
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Chapter 1: Introduction
One factor that researchers have sought to investigate is how hurricanes impact
the crime rates of affected communities. Unfortunately, economists have conducted little
research on the effects that hurricane landfalls have on communities. In the most recent
memories of many Americans, Hurricane Katrina stands out as a natural disaster of
biblical proportions. Louisiana has consistently been impacted by natural disasters of
similar magnitude. Thus, Louisiana serves as an excellent case study for this topic, since
it has been plagued with hurricanes throughout its existence. From 1851 to 2004,
Louisiana has been hit by 49 hurricanes, and out of those, 18 were at least a category 3
hurricane (Blake, Jarrell, and Rappaport).
On August 23, 2005, Hurricane Katrina began as a tropical depression over the
Bahamas. It made its initial landfall as a category 1 hurricane in Florida before passing
over the warm waters of the Gulf of Mexico and making its second landfall as a category
3 hurricane in Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana on August 27th. An analysis conducted by
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) indicates that Orleans Parish and
St. Bernard Parish suffered from extreme flooding (Hurricane Katrina, 2019). Although
New Orleans was not directly hit by the hurricane, its levees were destroyed by the
hurricane, and over 80 percent of the city was flooded for two weeks (Frailing and
Harper, 2007). Consequently, law enforcement was occupied with search and rescue
missions, leaving the city in a state of chaos (Frailing and Harper, 2007). Katrina has
proven to be one of the costliest hurricanes in US history, with the Office for Coastal
Management estimating reparation costs totaling approximately $161 billion. The exact
death toll from Hurricane Katrina is still not known to this day.
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In light of this, my research investigates how hurricanes have contributed to crime
in Louisiana, and more specifically, how Hurricane Katrina impacted various crime rates
in this historic state. The findings from this study will have numerous implications and
will help to provide some clarity on a complex topic.

Chapter 2: Literature Review
The attempt to determine what affects crime is one of the most popular, and
seemingly straightforward, topics in economics that researchers have attempted to
address. Yet upon closer investigation, it becomes much more complicated and complex
to tackle than upon initial evaluation. Corman and Mocan (1999) succinctly explain the
economic conceptual theory behind crime: “Optimizing individuals engage in criminal
activities depending upon the expected payoffs of the criminal activity, the return to legal
labor market activity, tastes, and the costs of criminal activity, such as those associated
with apprehension, conviction and punishment” (1).
The causes and implications of crime have relevance to many sectors of the
economy, from education to healthcare. In addition, there is a plethora of variables that
can affect crime, from economic recessions and governmental policies to environmental
conditions. Consequently, much research has been conducted as to how specific factors
affect various types of crimes in a variety of fields. However, much of the findings from
this research are conflicting or inconclusive.
Crime has both direct and indirect costs to not only the victim of the offense, but
also to the economy. Deterrence efforts and law enforcement must be funded, which are
paid for through taxes (Gibbons, 2004). The U.S. Department of Education reported an 89
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percent increase on state and local spending on corrections 1989 to 2013. In addition to
this, crime has also been found to have effects on the labor market, such as
unemployment rates, and can lead to wage inequality among homogenous workers
(Burdett, Lagos, and Wright, 2001). Thus, it is relevant to everyone to examine the
possible variables affecting crime, as more and more of the government’s budget is
diverted towards paying for the costs of crime and less is spent on other important areas
of the economy, such as education and healthcare.
It is not unreasonable to predict that some types of crime may increase in response
to the chaos and destruction hurricanes cause, and there is literature to support that.
Although the literature in the field of economics regarding crime and natural disasters is
sparse, there is a considerable amount of research on this topic in crime and geography
journals. Spencer and Strobl (2019) find that hurricanes cause crime to rise by 35 percent.
More specifically, they find that aggravated assault, break-ins, and shootings increase
during hurricanes, while murder, rape, and robbery decline. Spencer and Strobl assert that
the response of crime to hurricanes is largely determined by whether there is a storm
warning. However, Leitner, Barnett, Kent, and Barnett (2011) provide support for the
contrary and find that crime rates remain stable or even decline in areas that receive
evacuees.
According to Walker, Sim, and Keys-Mathews (2012), using data from Hurricane
Ivan in Alabama, larceny declines during the landfall of hurricanes, while burglary tends
to increase. Zahran, Shelly, Peek, and Brody (2009) find that property crimes (burglary,
larceny, and motor vehicle theft) decrease in response to natural disasters as well.
Varano, Schafer, Cancino, Decker, and Greene (2010) on the other hand, find little to no
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relationship between crime and hurricanes. Thus, it is not quite clear whether to expect
crime to increase or to decrease in response to hurricanes and other natural disasters.
Using data on hurricanes Bertha and Fran that hit North Carolina, Ewing and
Kruse (2005) find that hurricanes cause unemployment rates to rise. In addition, using
data on hurricanes that impacted Florida, Belasen and Polacheck (2008) find that in
counties directly hit by hurricanes, employment decreases and wages increase. Belasen
and Polacheck attribute this increase in earnings to demand shocks in the labor market
triggered by the hurricane in counties directly hit. However, neighboring counties see a
decrease in earnings in wake of hurricanes, according to their study. These findings,
though, present another possible relationship to be examined.
According to Becker (1968), rational economic agents will decide whether to
engage in criminal activity in response to economic incentives, such as legal and illegal
market opportunities, that will maximize utility. Consequently, this leads to the
expectation that a decrease in legal real wages will lead to an increase in crime (Mocan et
al., 2005). Supporting this theory are Machin and Meghir (2004), who find that increased
wages have significant and large impacts on crime rates using data from England and
Wales. Doyle, Ahmed, and Horn (1999) also establish a negative relationship between
wages and property crime. In addition, Bignon, Caroli, and Galbiati (2016) state that
“individuals with high reservation wages are unlikely to commit property crimes as a
result of an unemployment spell” (27). If they have a higher opportunity cost, they are
less likely to commit the crime.
Mocan and Unel (2011) note an asymmetric relationship between crimes and
wages, in that a decrease in earnings has a stronger impact on crime when compared to an

4

increase in earnings of the same size. They also find no impact of wages on violent crime.
In addition, Williams and Sickles (2002), find no statistically significant relationship
between crime and wages. They note that one possible reason for this is that current
wages may not serve as the best measure of the opportunity cost of crime.
As with wages, the relationship between crime and unemployment can vary
drastically when discussing different types of crime. Much of the research conducted on
the relationship between property crime and unemployment points to a positive
relationship between these two variables. Edmark (2005) finds a positive relationship
between unemployment and property crime, which she defines as burglary, robbery, car
theft, bike theft, theft/pilfering from motor vehicles and shops respectively, and fraud.
Moreover, research conducted by Raphael and Winter-Ebmer (1998), Lin (2008), and
Bignon et al. (2016) provide further support for a positive relationship between property
crime and unemployment. Prescott and Pyle (2019) confirm Raphael and Winter-Ebmer’s
findings as well.
The relationship between unemployment and violent crimes is unclear. Many
researchers find no relationship between unemployment and violent crimes, while others
find a positive relationship, and yet others find even a negative relationship. For example,
Tsushima (1996) finds a positive relationship between unemployment and homicide.
Similarly, Frailing, Harper, and Serpas (2015) suggest that Katrina’s effect on the drug
market indirectly impacted New Orleans’ murder rate, noting that the murder rate in New
Orleans increased immediately after the hurricane. They mention that another possible
cause for this increase in murder is due to the dramatic decrease of emergency medical
facilities during this period. Supporting the positive relationship between unemployment
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and violent crimes are Nordin and Almén (2011), who find that long-term unemployment
leads to an increase in violent crimes. These findings suggest that the motivational
perspective has a stronger effect here.
In regards to the relationship between unemployment and larceny, the literature is
inconclusive. In Bijou Yang Lester’s paper (1995), a positive relationship between the
two is established, and Cantor and Land (1985) provide compelling support for this as
well. However, others find a negative relationship between unemployment and larceny,
such as Britt (1994). Also establishing a negative relationship between unemployment
rates and larceny is Lee (2018).

Chapter 3: Data
The crime data utilized for this project has been collected from the FBI Uniform
Crime Reporting Program (UCR) through the Inter-University Consortium for Political
and Social Research (ICPSR). The data from the ICPSR is a part of the UCR county-level
detailed arrest and offense data series consisting of yearly observations from 1995 to
2014 for all states at the county level. Data used from this series include counts of arrests
and offenses for murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, auto theft,
and arson and counts of arrests for forgery, fraud, embezzlement, vandalism, weapons
violations, sex offenses, drug and alcohol abuse violations, gambling, vagrancy, curfew
violations, and runaways, according to the UCR. From these, I limit the crime types to
murder, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, and auto theft since those are
most commonly used in the literature. I subsequently use these counts to calculate the
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rates at parish level per 100,000 people for each year to control for parish and county
size.
Data reported to the FBI’s UCR Program is submitted on a voluntary basis. For
those agencies that choose to participate in the program, reports on crimes known to the
police and on persons arrested are provided to the UCR. The data is typically collected
annually with uniform crime definitions that are sent to a centralized repository within
the state, which are subsequently forwarded to the UCR. Crime rates included in this
study are at the county and parish level for all states from 1995 to 2014. Since my paper
is only concerning parishes1 within Louisiana, I limit the sample data to Louisiana for the
main analysis.
Unemployment information is collected from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Variables collected from the BLS are at the parish level and are yearly estimates from
1995-2014; US territories are excluded. Demographic variables are collected from the
CDC and include total white population per county and total female population per
county.
Table 1 presents the summary statistics and descriptions of the main variables,
which are separated based on whether the area was a parish affected by Hurricane
Katrina. Most variables in parishes affected by Katrina have higher rates than in those not
affected by Katrina. Aggravated assault is the only exception. In addition, I conducted a
t-test to compare the true means between parishes affected by Katrina and parishes not
affected by Katrina for all of the variables. Burglary, motor vehicle theft, larceny,

1

Louisiana has a parish system rather than county system.
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robbery, and murder have statistically different means between those parishes affected by
Katrina and those not affected by Katrina.
Table 2 presents the summary statistics and descriptions of the main variables. It
is apparent from these statistics that nearly all types of crimes rates in Louisiana are
substantially higher than the US average, specifically the murder rate (7.08 per 100,000
compared to 3.26), larceny rate (1,901 compared to 1,465), robbery rate (65.1 compared
to 37.96), motor vehicle theft rate (168.89 compared to 142.43), burglary rate (709.04
compared to 527.64), and the aggravated assault rate (409.47 compared to 188.55).

Chapter 4: Empirical Strategy
A differences-in-differences (DD) model is used to estimate the effect that
Hurricane Katrina had on crime in New Orleans. Hurricane Katrina can be considered an
exogenous, or random, event because of its unpredictable nature, as most people have
little warning and only a short amount of time to prepare for the hurricane. The treatment
group in this model is comprised of the parishes in Louisiana affected by Hurricane
Katrina, and the control group consists of parishes in Louisiana that were not affected by
Katrina. The estimation equation for the DD model is as follows:

𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑐𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 𝐾𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑐 + 𝛼2 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼3 (𝐾𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑐 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 ) +
𝛼4 𝑈𝑐𝑡 + 𝛼5 𝑊𝑐𝑡 + 𝛼6 𝐹𝑐𝑡 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝜂𝑐 + 𝜋𝑐𝑡 + 𝜀𝑐𝑡 ,

where 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑐𝑡 represents the crime rate in the particular parish c in year t, 𝐾𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑐 is a
dummy variable signifying the parishes that were affected by Katrina, 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 is a dummy
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variable to represent the years after Hurricane Katrina, Uct is the unemployment rate, Wct
is the percent of whites in a parish, and Fct is the percent of females in a parish. Also
included in the regression are time trends, 𝜇𝑡 , parish fixed effects, 𝜂𝑐 and parish-level
time trends, 𝜋𝑐𝑡 . The error term in the equation is represented by 𝜀𝑐𝑡 . Standard errors are
clustered at parish level. The parameter of interest in the equation is the coefficient of the
interaction term, 𝛼3 (𝐾𝑎𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑐 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 ), which is created from the Katrina parish
dummy and post-Katrina dummy. This signifies the differences-in-differences estimate,
and it shows the impact of Katrina on crime in parishes after the fact based on whether
they were impacted by the hurricane.

Chapter 5: Results
Main Results
The results from the regression estimating the effect of the hurricane on crime in
Louisiana are presented in Table 3, and the interpretation of the interaction term is of
particular interest. The Katrina County*Post Hurricane interaction term coefficient is
positive for all of the crime rates; however, not all are statistically significant. For
burglary, the DD coefficient is 332.4 and is statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
In other words, in parishes hit by Katrina after the hurricane hit, the burglary rate
increased by 332.4 per 100,000 people. This appears to coincide with the findings
presented in Figure 1, as the burglary rate sees a sharp increase right after Hurricane
Katrina. Moreover, these results support the findings presented by Walker, Sim, and
Keys-Mathews (2012) that the burglary rate increases in response to hurricanes. One
possible explanation for the increased burglaries in the wake of the hurricane is lack of

9

law enforcement during this time of chaos and that much of this type of crime is a crime
of opportunity. During chaotic times like the period following a hurricane, much of law
enforcement efforts are diverted to rescuing civilians from the flooding. It is then possible
that criminals recognize this and use this as an opportunity to steal and burglarize, which
would explain the increase in burglary. In addition, during this time, people lose their
jobs, decreasing the opportunity cost of committing crime.
Larceny also increases by 506.4 per 100,000 people when regressed against the
differences-in-differences estimate, and it is statistically significant at the 10 percent
level. This finding is somewhat supported by the graph, as larceny does increase some
after the hurricane. One possible explanation for this increase in the larceny rate is that
Hurricane Katrina caused many people to lose everything, including their jobs and their
homes. As many people had no way to earn an income, they resort to crimes like larceny
which explains the increase seen here. In addition to larceny and burglary increasing,
robbery increases in response to the interaction variable as well by 59.57 per 100,000
people, and is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. It certainly plausible for
larceny to increase for similar reasons as burglary and larceny.
The DD coefficient for motor vehicle theft, however, is not statistically
significant, so it does not appear to be responsive to the hurricane. This matches the
graph presented for motor vehicle theft, as the slope does not appear to change for
affected parishes after the hurricane; it merely continues downward. One plausible
explanation is due to the fact that since many people evacuated prior to Katrina, there
were probably fewer cars left to steal or many of the cars that remained were damaged,
and thus the motor vehicle theft rate does not change.
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Although the coefficients for aggravated assault and murder are both positive,
neither are statistically significant, meaning that the DD coefficient is to be interpreted as
0. In other words, aggravated assault and murder neither increase nor decrease in
response to the hurricane, so I am unable to provide evidence that supports the literature
in regards to these two crimes.
The Katrina variable is positive and statistically significant for all crimes except
for larceny and murder. For motor vehicle theft and burglary, it is positive and
statistically significant at the 10 percent level. It is statistically significant at the 1 percent
level for aggravated assault, and it is statistically significant at the 10 percent level for
robbery. For both of these crimes just mentioned, this implies that crime is higher in
counties hit by Hurricane Katrina than in counties not hit by Katrina, independent of
time.
The post-hurricane variable is statistically significant for motor vehicle theft and
aggravated assault, whose coefficients are -23.16 and 114.1, respectively. This means that
crime is higher in parishes after Hurricane Katrina hit, regardless of whether it was
affected by Katrina. Race does not appear to play a role in crime based on these results,
as none of the coefficients are statistically significant. As for the female coefficient, it is
positive and statistically significant for burglary and robbery. In other words, the more
females there are in a parish, the higher rates of burglary and robbery we see. This could
suggest that more females are the victims of burglary and robbery, possibly because they
are targeted for these kinds of crimes more often.
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Event-Study Analysis
One of the main assumptions of the differences-in-differences estimate is the
parallel trends assumption, which assumes that in the absence of treatment (Hurricane
Katrina), the control and treated groups would have continued in a parallel fashion. To
test this assumption, I conducted an event-study analysis in which I allowed the treatment
(the hurricane) to have an effect in the years prior to its impact. As explained by
Altindag, Filiz, and Tekin (2020), “If these placebo effects are statistically
significant…then we would worry that the “parallel trends” assumption fails” (17). The
results from the event-study are most easily represented graphically and are presented in
Figure 3. The point estimates of the interaction are represented by the bars, and the lines
signify the 95 percent confidence interval. As Katrina occurred in 2005, the omitted year
is 2004.
Based on Figure 3, we can see that for all crime rates there are no pre-existing
differences between affected and non-affected parishes. In other words, the interaction
term between Hurricane Katrina and years before Katrina are not statistically different
than one another. For burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft, there is a clear
difference between parishes before and after the hurricane. I also conducted the same
analysis on the total crime rate, which is the summation of the crime rates in this study.
The same pattern is observed for total crime as well. These results suggest that the
parallel trends assumption holds for most of the outcome variables and that Hurricane
Katrina is an exogenous event, allowing for a causal interpretation in the main results.
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The Continuing Impact of Hurricane Katrina
To evaluate the continuing impact of Katrina on the parishes it hit, I create a postKatrina dummy variable first for the year 2006, where it is set to equal 1 if the year is
2006 and 0 for all other years, then 1 for 2006 and for 2007 and 0 for all other years, and
so on until 2011. Interacting each of these post-Katrina year dummies with the Katrina
county dummies allows us to specifically see the impact of Katrina each year after its
landfall in affected parishes in more detail. The results from this are presented in Table 4.
Every row for each crime variable represents a separate regression where the linear time
trend, parish level time trends, and parish fixed effects are controlled for. Based on the
table, it appears that Katrina has the longest lasting impact on burglaries, as its coefficient
is positive and statistically significant for all six post hurricane variables I create.
Consequently, this can be interpreted as Hurricane Katrina causing burglary to increase
for several years after its landfall. Katrina also appears to have caused all but murder to
increase; however, the result is not long-term.

Comparing the Effect of Hurricane Katrina to Other Hurricanes
In Appendix Table 1, I run a model in which the interaction terms represent
various hurricanes rather than just Hurricane Katrina to compare the effect of Katrina to
other hurricanes.
The first panel in this table, Panel A, presents the main results from Table 3 and is
shown here for comparison purposes. In Panel B, the interaction term is created from all
category 3 hurricanes that hit Louisiana within the designated time period. Burglary,
motor vehicle theft, robbery, and murder increase in response to the interaction term,
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Hurricane County*Post Hurricane. All but motor vehicle theft are statistically significant
at the 1 percent level; motor vehicle theft is statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
As for Panel C, only aggravated assault and murder are statistically significant, and it is
at the 10 percent and 1 percent level, respectively. Aggravated assault decreases in
response to the interaction term, while murder continues to increase. All other crime rates
remain stagnant when regressed against the interaction variable. One possible explanation
for these differences is that the different hurricanes have varied effects on crimes
depending on how the counties or parishes prepared for the hurricane.

Chapter 6: Conclusion
This study has sought to investigate the impact of hurricanes on crime using
Hurricane Katrina’s impact on Louisiana as a case study. Given that there is such sparse
literature in economics on this topic specifically, this paper contributes significantly to
the literature by filling that gap in it. Consequently, much of the literature included in my
research comes from geography sources; however, even the literature that does exist in
other fields is conflicting. Some predict particular crimes to decrease in response to
hurricanes, while others predict no response or even an increase for those same crime
rates.
The results presented in this study suggest that Hurricane Katrina caused burglary,
larceny, and robbery to increase following its landfall. These findings hold even after
controlling for numerous specifications and provide compelling evidence for the sparse
literature. The extensions I conduct in this study suggest that Hurricane Katrina had a
lasting impact on Louisiana, especially on the burglary rate, which saw an increase for
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years after the landfall of Katrina. This coincides with what can be seen of places that
received the worst of the hurricane, like New Orleans, which has never fully recovered
from the hurricane. My findings from this study partially support those from Walker et
al.’s (2012) study, which predicts a decrease in larceny and increase in burglary. Future
research on this topic in economics could further examine the effect of hurricanes on
other types of crime.
There are several implications that follow as a result of this study, the main of
which being on law enforcement policies in areas affected by hurricanes. As the results of
my research lend support to the opportunity perspective, law enforcement policies should
consequently be focused at increasing the opportunity cost to committing crimes,
especially in the wake of natural disasters like hurricanes.
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Figure 1: Mean Crime Rate for Parishes in LA
(1995-2014)

21

Figure 2: Event-Study
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Variable

Burglary Rate
Motor Vehicle Theft
Rate
Larceny Rate
Aggravated Assault
Rate
Robbery Rate
Murder Rate
Unemployment Rate
White Population (%)
Female Population
(%)
Number Observations

Table 1
Descriptive Statistics for Louisiana Parishes, Affected vs. Not Affected
Parishes
Parishes Not
Description
Affected by
Affected by
Katrina
Katrina
Mean
Mean
(Std. Dev.)
(Std. Dev.)
Total count of burglaries per county divided
903.472
672.843
by county population, multiplied by 100,000
(524.709)
(423.322)
Total count of motor vehicle thefts per county 365.904
138.353
divided by county population, multiplied by
(402.963)
(128.486)
100,000
Total count of larcenies per county divided by 2333.225
1812.149
county population, multiplied by 100,000
(1059.268)
(1160.842)
Total count of rapes per county divided by
388.618
410.404
county population, multiplied by 100,000
(251.613)
(301.756)
Total count of robberies per county divided by 132.755
53.920
county population, multiplied by 100,000
(166.032)
(63.226)
Total count of murders per county divided by
12.856
6.114
county population, multiplied by 100,000
(16.496)
(6.999)
Percent of unemployed individuals
6.693
7.37
(1.692)
(2.420)
Percent of white population per county
67.488
66.57871
(17.188)
(13.89014)
Total female population per county divided by 51.407
50.519
total county population, multiplied by 100
(4.098)
(3.138139)
179
1,093

T-Test

***
***

***
***
***
***
***

Notes: (1) *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1. (2) The last column, the t-test column, is presented here to test whether the means between parishes affected
and unaffected by the hurricane are statistically different.
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Table 2
Descriptive Statistics
Variable

Description

Burglary Rate

Total count of burglaries per county divided by county population,
multiplied by 100,000
Total count of motor vehicle thefts per county divided by county
population, multiplied by 100,000
Total count of larcenies per county divided by county population,
multiplied by 100,000
Total count of rapes per county divided by county population, multiplied
by 100,000
Total count of robberies per county divided by county population,
multiplied by 100,000
Total count of murders per county divided by county population,
multiplied by 100,000
=1 if state affected by Katrina and 0 if not

Motor Vehicle Theft
Rate
Larceny Rate
Aggravated Assault
Rate
Robbery Rate
Murder Rate
Katrina State Dummy
Post-Katrina Dummy
Katrina County Dummy

=1 if years after Katrina and 0 for years before Katrina (including the
year of Katrina)
=1 if county affected by Katrina and 0 if not affected

Unemployment Rate

Percent of unemployed individuals

White Population (%)

Percent of white population per county

Female Population (%)

Total female population per county divided by total county population,
multiplied by 100

Number Observations

Louisiana
Mean
(Std. Dev.)
709.042
(445.388)
168.886
(208.292)
1901.105
(1162.688)
409.468
(296.912)
65.153
(90.545)
7.085
(9.273)
1
(0)
0.059
(0.236)
0.136
(0.343)
7.224
(2.343914)
66.613
(14.243)
50.543
(2.950)

US
Mean
(Std. Dev.)
527.64
(424.07)
142.43
(171.97)
1465.02
(1130.12)
188.55
(213.3)
37.96
(71.45)
3.26
(6.58)
(.020)
(.141)
0.002
(0.044)
0.004
(0.065)
6.218
(2.879)
86.08
(16.22)
50.15
(2.68)

1,272

52,843

Notes: (1) The data is from FBI UCR covering years 1995 to 2014. (2) All statistics are at county/parish level. (3) Louisiana sample includes 64 parishes of
Louisiana. (4) US sample includes all states and District of Columbia.
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Table 3: Effect of Hurricane Katrina on Crime Rates, 1995-2014

Variables

Katrina County
Post Hurricane
Katrina County * Post
Hurricane
Unemployment Rate
White (%)
Female (%)
Constant

Observations

Burglary

Motor Vehicle
Theft

Larceny Aggravated Robbery
Assault

Murder

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

507.0**
(197.2)
59.87
(40.54)
332.4**
(150.2)

145.0**
(69.82)
-23.16*
(13.17)
32.51
(36.00)

332.0
(325.9)
46.08
(83.98)
506.4*
(254.0)

337.9***
(113.7)
114.1***
(42.08)
31.66
(66.11)

75.50*
(38.88)
2.536
(4.365)
59.57*
(35.58)

4.475
(3.627)
-0.00249
(0.965)
5.676
(3.859)

24.98***
(9.064)
-7.504
(12.40)
27.09*
(16.19)
-284.4
(508.5)

-4.239*
(2.332)
-1.256
(5.707)
10.11
(9.025)
-353.0***
(123.8)

59.33***
(20.48)
-2.365
(25.86)
43.43
(39.64)
56.66
(675.0)

12.72*
(6.599)
6.426
(8.475)
6.516
(13.15)
-588.5*
(305.2)

2.018*
(1.046)
-0.987
(2.143)
5.907***
(1.567)
-219.2
(148.1)

-0.0125
(0.141)
-0.354
(0.258)
0.620
(0.439)
-0.825
(15.27)

1,264

1,264

1,264

1,264

1,264

1,264

Notes: (1) *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1. (2) Linear trend is controlled for (3) Standard errors are clustered at
county level (4) Parish specific time trends have been controlled for (4) Sample is only parishes in Louisiana.
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Table 4: The Long-Term Impact of Hurricane Katrina

Variables

Katrina County * Post 0
Katrina County * Post 1
Katrina County * Post 2
Katrina County * Post 3
Katrina County * Post 4
Katrina County * Post 5
Observations

Burglary

Motor Vehicle
Theft

Larceny

Aggravated
Assault

Robbery

Murder

(1)
361.3*
(197.4)
274.5***
(99.68)
292.4***
(102.1)
245.0**
(102.9)
204.5*
(111.5)
188.6*
(112.4)
1,258

(2)
81.48
(56.37)
65.77*
(38.53)
28.11
(33.70)
-20.49
(49.55)
-50.06
(63.91)
-72.68
(75.17)
1,258

(3)
428.8***
(121.2)
286.5
(200.3)
289.1*
(166.3)
248.1
(183.1)
185.8
(218.0)
162.4
(236.4)
1,258

(4)
95.90**
(38.17)
56.76
(57.53)
39.51
(55.66)
24.25
(60.03)
-1.770
(63.60)
-14.09
(61.49)
1,258

(5)
30.59***
(10.78)
16.29
(11.21)
2.738
(16.25)
-8.994
(22.81)
-18.56
(26.94)
-23.63
(29.84)
1,258

(6)
0.944
(1.789)
4.712
(4.134)
4.887
(3.190)
3.447
(2.594)
2.436
(2.122)
2.386
(1.914)
1,258

Notes: (1) *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1. (2) Linear trend is controlled for. (3) Standard errors are clustered at parish level. (4) Parish
specific time trends have been controlled for. (4) Sample is only parishes in Louisiana. (5) Every row for each crime variable represents a
separate regression where the linear time trend, parish level time trend, and parish fixed effects are controlled for.
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Appendix Table 1: Comparing Effect of Hurricane Katrina to Other Hurricanes
Variables

Panel A: Hurricane Katrina
Katrina County * Post Hurricane

Burglary

Motor Vehicle
Theft

Larceny

Aggravated
Assault

Robbery

Murder

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

332.438**
(150.215)

32.508
(35.996)

506.364*
(254.016)

31.660
(66.107)

59.573*
(35.578)

5.676
(3.859)

194.200*
(99.973)

30.790
(26.485)

140.567
(190.421)

59.333
(66.327)

40.835**
(19.446)

5.325**
(2.286)

-66.956
(78.137)
1,264

9.624
(18.135)
1,264

-136.979
(148.540)
1,264

-84.554
(71.537)
1,264

11.313
(11.324)
1,264

3.675*
(2.018)
1,264

Panel B: Category 3 Hurricanes
Hurricane County * Post Hurricane
Panel C: All Hurricanes
Hurricane County * Post Hurricane
Observations

Notes: (1) *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1. (2) Linear trend, unemployment rate, sex, and race are controlled for. (3) Standard errors are clustered at parish
level. (4) Parish specific time trends have been controlled for. (4) Sample is only parishes in Louisiana.
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